“棋盘上的战争”还是“茶壶中的风暴”？（全文中英对照）

Club提要：北京大学中东研究中心主任吴冰冰接受北京对话专访，就中东局势最新变化发表看法。

吴冰冰指出，以色列采取的是“消灭”对手的策略，而伊朗则坚持“长期消耗+发展”策略。当前中东局势就像是一场“茶壶中的风暴”，虽然局部冲突激烈，但整体局势仍保持“微妙的平衡”。

对于巴以问题长期解决方案，吴冰冰认为，依赖军事手段是不可行的，应通过政治途径和手段来解决。他指出，中国在中东地区所做出的努力，不仅着眼于解决当前冲突，更立足于推动整个地区长期和平与稳定。 

Abstract: Wu Bingbing, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at Peking University, sat down with Beijing Club for International Dialogue and shared his observations on the latest changes in the Middle East, the Gaza crisis in particular.

Wu noted that Israel aims to eliminate its opponents, whereas Iran seeks a long-term strategy to wear down its rivals while focusing on its own economic development. The current situation in the Middle East resembles a “storm in a teapot”: although local conflicts are intense, the overall situation maintains a “delicate balance.”

As for the long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Wu believes that it is not feasible to rely on military measures, and the issue should be resolved through political channels and means. He furthers by saying that China's efforts in the Middle East are not only focused on resolving the current conflicts, but also based on promoting long-term peace and stability in the region. 

韩桦（左）和吴冰冰（右）（图源：北京对话）

韩桦：您刚刚从中东地区回来，您如何评价当地整体局势？巴以冲突是否有进一步恶化的可能？中国能否在当前局势下发挥更积极的作用？ 

吴冰冰：中东地区实际上受到影响的范围还是有限的，包括加沙地带、巴勒斯坦、黎巴嫩，并不是说整个中东地区都受到的影响，所以我们看到阿联酋、沙特，包括埃及这些国家还在正常的运行。10月26日凌晨，以色列针对伊朗采取的打击行动，当时正好我的航班从阿联酋起飞，没有受任何影响，整个机场正常运转。这就说明，虽然局部冲突很激烈，但整个中东的大格局下，冲突的规模和范围还是有限的。很多中国学者讲，当前中东局势就像是一场“茶壶中的风暴”，虽然在冲突地区很激烈，但在整体的中东局势来看，整个地区并没有因此而陷入动荡。这一点很重要。我们到很多国家，包括海湾国家和北非国家，都可以畅通无阻的去旅行，甚至伊朗也是如此。

（专访视频：北京对话）‍‍‍‍‍‍

关于加沙的冲突，从以色列的角度来看，尽管他们设定了较高的军事目标，如消灭哈马斯、解救所有人质并解除对自身的威胁，但实际行动中，目标已开始更为集中。现在，以色列主要聚焦在两条走廊，一条是费城走廊，它是隔离加沙地带与埃及的区域，以往是由埃及和巴勒斯坦联合控制，而以色列担心物资通过西奈半岛进入加沙，因此打算重新控制这个走廊。另一条是纳扎里姆走廊，它将加沙分为南北两段，以便及时应对突发情况。以色列的军事重点已转向对两条走廊的控制，而非全面掌握加沙。

对以色列来说，它进入到了一种比较低烈度但是持续作战的状态。以色列的重心自9月以来转向黎巴嫩，尽管采取了空中打击和定点清除行动，但地面进展相对缓慢。从黎巴嫩的角度来看，以色列的目标并非消灭真主党，而是确保以色列北部居民的安全，因为真主党的火箭威胁使得以色列北部约12万居民无法在家居住，导致大量人口迁移。所以，以色列在黎巴嫩设定的目标是为了保护国内的安全，而非在黎巴嫩实现完全的军事胜利。虽然以色列的行动有所升级，但受到诸多外部因素的制约，比如法国和美国对黎巴嫩局势的关注，都不希望冲突扩大至整个黎巴嫩。虽然有升级的倾向，但其烈度和强度是受到限制的，因为一旦冲突蔓延，将会涉及到更广泛的问题，包括与叙利亚和伊朗相关的问题。

当前巴以冲突的长期解决，仅仅依靠军事手段是不行的。所有的军事行动最终都需要一个政治解决方案，军事手段本身并不是解决问题的长久之计。中国主张政治解决，既然要政治解决，就要坐下来谈。我们从去年沙特和伊朗的和解中已经看到了这一点，中国在中东外交中的斡旋角色越来越明显。

（专访视频：北京对话）

在我们看来，中国的立场很明确，就是通过斡旋达成政治解决，推动中东地区的和平稳定。中东的冲突不仅局限于加沙地带，在苏丹、也门等地也存在冲突和挑战。如果不将这些冲突降级，并找到一个政治解决的途径，和平稳定还是会受到威胁。因此，中国在中东的努力不仅仅是应对当前的巴以冲突，而是为了整个地区的长期稳定。

从我在中东的访问来看，很多当地人士对中国的角色充满期待。去年沙特与伊朗的和解，不仅缓解了他们之间的紧张局势，也减少了整个地区的焦点冲突，给了当地人一个希望，让他们相信冲突是可以缓和的。如果没有这个和解，人们可能会对和平的期望降低，对未来的信心也会减弱。中国的角色非常重要，尤其是在目前的中东局势下。

沙特伊朗和解（图源：路透社）

韩桦：您觉得下一个政治解决巴以冲突的时间点将在何时？

吴冰冰：我想现在的挑战在于，以色列有它的国内政治的诉求。因为即便是在去年10月7日之前，以色列国内的政治矛盾就已经非常尖锐，那时候每个周末都会有上百万人的游行，对内塔尼亚胡政府的司法改革措施表达不满。所以从这个角度看，以色列国内政治的压力影响着他们在地区的政策选择。

实际上，冲突在进行中，国内的很多问题就暂时被淡化了。如果冲突平息下来，国内政治的问题可能又会冒出来。因此，不仅要看到美国和地区的因素，还要注意到以色列国内的因素。这些因素对局势的影响很大，目前还没到解决的那个时间点。以色列政府通过战争缓解了国内的压力，所以目前看，现政府还有（战争）需求。

费城走廊位于埃及边境，内塔尼亚胡声称只有以色列才能控制该过境点，以阻止哈马斯将其俘虏偷运出加沙或将武器和其他违禁品走私进来（图源：路透社）

韩桦：那美国对战争的态度呢？以色列购买了那么多的武器，这对美国的军工复合体来说，是不是一种刺激？他们也许不希望那么快推动政治解决，有这个考虑吗？

吴冰冰：美国对以色列的援助，其实是通过允许以色列购买美国的军火来实现的，但用的还是美国的军事援助资金。这是一部分。另一部分是美国在以色列有前置的武器储备，以色列可以直接使用，甚至可以调动其他地区的武器储备。从这个角度来看，以色列更多是一个消耗方。而对美国来说，这也成为了一个国内的军事项目，它可以增加产出。

韩桦：这样就激活了美国的军工复合体，对吗？

吴冰冰：是的，其实对美国来说，不仅如此，美国还受益于其他阿拉伯国家对其武器的需求。通过外国的资金购买美国的军火，这样美国国内的军工产业就得以保持活力。

沙特外相访问伊朗（图源：新华网）

韩桦：那在阿拉伯国家中，比如沙特，在这次金砖峰会上表现得非常低调，和他们申请加入金砖的身份不太一致。这是否与沙特对美国武器的需求相关？

吴冰冰：中东的局势非常复杂，沙特在也门的表现，显示出其国防能力和国家安全维护能力的相对薄弱。他们面对以色列和伊朗，必须考虑如何维护自己的安全。而这不仅仅是买多少军火的问题，还需要形成自己独立的安全能力。就目前来看，沙特仍然需要外部的安全支持，而能够提供这种全面支持的国家还是美国。

沙特与美国之间的关系历史悠久，因此他们对美国有很高的期待。去年我们看到沙特与美国之间一直在讨论签订一个防御协定，甚至希望将双方的关系从伙伴关系提升到类似韩国和日本那样的盟友关系。沙特希望美国能够为其提供更充分的安全保障，甚至是保护。

韩桦：国家安全问题确实很关键。您提到中东地区局势，小范围内冲突比较激烈，但大范围内相对稳定。这是一种默契吗？

吴冰冰：对于中东局势，我们可以看到阿拉伯国家的政府对以色列和加沙的冲突、以色列和黎巴嫩的冲突，以及伊朗和以色列的冲突，采取了旁观的立场。虽然他们表态谴责，比如这次以色列对伊朗的打击，沙特和阿联酋都表示谴责，但没有采取实际行动。海湾国家与伊朗之间达成了一个共识，即不允许以色列利用他们的领空进行打击，但这并不代表他们在冲突中选择了立场。海湾国家和大多数阿拉伯国家从政府的角度保持了一种中立和旁观的态度，这种态度决定了他们并没有深度介入到冲突中。

（专访视频：北京对话）

韩桦：所以说，虽然局部冲突激烈，但整体局势依然保持稳定？

吴冰冰：是的，从目前来看，这些国家仍然在按照各自的方式推进正常事务，没有因为局部冲突而完全改变他们的外交或安全策略。这也是为什么中东局势在局部冲突之外，能够保持一种“微妙的平衡”。

韩桦：伊朗在当前巴以冲突中采取了什么样的策略？在中东的影响力又是怎样的？

吴冰冰：从伊朗的角度讲，它与以色列之间的关系是一种长期相持阶段的消耗，因为伊朗不可能消灭以色列，同样以色列也不可能消灭伊朗。因此，伊朗的态度很明确，它不是想通过一两次的军事行动来不计成本、不计代价地对以色列发起攻击，而是采取一种长期抵抗的策略。作为抵抗轴心，伊朗在周边与非国家行为体的合作，比如真主党和哈马斯直接参与冲突，伊拉克和胡塞武装则通过他们各自的方式对以色列进行袭扰或攻击。然而，伊朗自身避免与以色列发生大规模的直接军事对抗。

伊朗的策略是提供装备和顾问支持，而不是直接参战。过去十几年间，尽管伊朗在叙利亚有军事存在，但它一直保持克制，没有直接参与到全面战争中。即使以色列在4月1日攻击了伊朗驻大马士革的领事馆，伊朗的回应也是克制的，避免导致局势的进一步加剧和升级。

总体上，伊朗的策略是保持低成本的消耗模式，避免高昂的战争开支。与以色列的技术优势和情报优势相比，伊朗通过低成本的无人机和导弹武器来进行消耗，以此推高以色列的防御成本。因此，从伊朗的角度，它希望维持这种长期相持状态，而不把整个地区拖入大规模冲突。

（专访视频：北京对话）

韩桦：既然采取了这种低成本消耗的策略，您认为伊朗的国家战略是什么？

吴冰冰：伊朗的战略主要体现在“抵抗”这一点上，抵抗是伊朗在地区内的一种品牌（战略定位，代表其对美国霸权的反对，以及对以色列占领巴勒斯坦的反对。这两个目标非常明确。同时，伊朗在周边和全球南方也有一个清晰的战略，主要包括与周边国家的睦邻友好关系的维护，以及在全球南方的合作，例如对中亚国家的重视，与海湾国家的合作缓和，以及对中国和俄罗斯的重视。伊朗在金砖国家、上合组织、非洲和拉美的合作关系不断提升，这些战略目标相互匹配，形成了整体的国家战略。

韩桦：这应该是一个并行的战略，对吧？

吴冰冰：没错。伊朗一方面坚持抵抗，另一方面也在寻求发展。抵抗并不意味着纯粹的冲突，它也是一种策略。比如在核问题和制裁问题上，伊朗会与西方国家进行必要的沟通和协调。这种高度灵活的策略，有助于伊朗在地区内扩大影响力。

韩桦：现在沙特与伊朗计划在红海海域举行联合军事演习，包括埃及也有意加入。您能确认这一消息吗？美西方对此会有怎样的应对？

吴冰冰：根据目前的报道，法新社提到沙特与伊朗实际上在阿曼湾进行了联合演习，而不是红海。红海因为胡塞武装的存在，相对更加敏感。阿曼湾的演习更关注波斯湾及霍尔木兹海峡的通道安全问题。对于沙特和伊朗来说，这是一种互信建设的步骤。通过这种方式，双方不仅能增加互信，还能降低波斯湾沿岸的安全冲突。这也是双方关系缓和的重要转折点。

尽管沙特和伊朗之间长期存在竞争关系，但达成互信仍然是双方的目标。沙特方面也认识到，在构建经济发展和2030愿景的背景下，必须要有一个稳定和平的周边环境。因此，沙特必须在伊朗问题上采取一些主动的外交行动，而不能完全依赖美国的保障。

韩桦：所以，这也是通过军演来加强军事实力的一种做法吗？

吴冰冰：没错。沙特必须主动提升自身的安全能力，这不仅可以减少对外部的依赖，也有助于自身实力的提高。 

韩桦：沙特的这种态度是否也代表了海湾国家的整体立场？比如阿联酋对这些冲突的态度又如何？

吴冰冰：在以色列于10月26日对伊朗发动袭击后，阿联酋公开谴责了以色列。这也反映了海湾国家与伊朗之间的共识，即不允许以色列利用他们的领空。这不仅是单个国家的立场，而是整个海湾国家的诉求。

以军轰炸杰巴利耶地区一所学校（图源：新华社）

韩桦：所以说，海湾国家之间有一定的共识？

吴冰冰：是的。一个和平稳定的海湾地区对阿拉伯国家和伊朗都有利。因此，围绕这些共识，各方之间的互动可能会增加。例如，我们看到10月1日后，伊朗外长访问了卡塔尔，并与沙特外长进行了会晤。卡塔尔的态度相对更加开放，沙特也在做更多的外交努力。尽管各国的步调有所不同，有的更加主动，有的则稍显跟随，但整体上他们之间确实存在一定的默契。

韩桦：那么，海湾国家之间的这些互动和平衡会对整个加沙局势产生怎样的影响？‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍

吴冰冰：现在关于加沙停火的谈判，阿拉伯国家的主要参与方是卡塔尔和埃及。在卡塔尔，谈判主要由美方、以色列、卡塔尔和埃及主导，而众多阿拉伯国家实际上没有参与进来。国家越多，推动的力量越大，但同时这也带来了不同的声音，有时可能会成为解决问题的阻力。

韩桦：阿拉伯国家在推动停火方面有分歧吗？

吴冰冰：在加沙问题上，目标非常明确，就是停火和人道主义援助。从这个角度看，阿拉伯国家内部并没有大的分歧。主要的障碍在于以色列方面不断提出新的要求，阿拉伯国家的加入会强化推动停火的力量。

中国常驻联合国代表傅聪：落实“两国方案”是解决中东问题唯一可行出路（图源：澎湃新闻）

韩桦：下一步政治解决，阿拉伯国家能发挥什么作用吗？

吴冰冰：政治解决的难度在于，目前找不到一个战后时代的加沙解决方案。以色列在过去一年的冲突中，对“两国方案”的意愿更弱了。要改变以色列的意愿，现在看来是非常困难的。因此，阿拉伯国家也没有明确的操作方案。如果以色列方面没有明确的建国方案，特别是对加沙地区的治理方案不明确，阿拉伯国家深度介入的可能性也不大。

韩桦：所以在实际操作中，应该从哪里开始？

吴冰冰：以色列方面，没有明确的走向巴勒斯坦建国的可操作性方案。对于巴勒斯坦来说，除“两国方案”之外，没有其他现实的解决方案。然而，目前的情感对立和国内政治问题，使得推动“两国方案”的可能性非常小。

韩桦：巴以冲突及外溢风险对全球供应链的影响有多大？

吴冰冰：目前来看，这次冲突对全球供应链的影响是有限的。虽然一开始可能有人担心油价上涨，但以色列并没有像它声称的那样打击伊朗的石油设施，国际油价反而有下跌的趋势。因此，这次冲突对全球经济的影响相对较小。

韩桦：“冲突影响有限”听起来是好事，但这是否也会让各方对停止军事冲突、推动政治解决的紧迫感减弱？

吴冰冰：确实，如果冲突的延续对全球经济利益没有显著影响，各方可能就不那么紧迫地推动政治解决。虽然对一些红海沿岸国家的影响会更大，但沙特等主要国家目前并未表现出深度介入的积极态度。

韩桦：这种态度是否意味着，深度的政治参与并不一定有利于保护经济利益？

吴冰冰：是的。像沙特这些国家，如果过度参与政治和安全事务，可能面临更大的挑战。比如，国际社会的集体努力，包括联合国和美国的多次尝试，都未能推动以色列停火。这让各国在评估自身参与的效果时，也会更加谨慎。

韩桦：那该如何评估各方的参与和影响呢？

吴冰冰：现在主要的问题是认知上的分歧。以色列方面仍将消灭哈马斯作为目标，并且试图削弱真主党。因此，它依然选择军事手段解决问题。我们认为，军事解决本身不是一个长久的解决方案，这种认知的差异是当前局势的主要障碍。

当地时间9月1日，停火谈判陷入混乱，特拉维夫数十万人游行冲击以色列（图源：新华网）

韩桦：对全球经济的长期影响是否也会有限？

吴冰冰：我们看到大宗商品的价格，尤其是石油的价格，并没有受到很大的影响。尽管红海运输路线对于欧洲和全球石油供应占有重要地位，但替代性的方案也存在。因此，整体影响是有限的。

韩桦：媒体上很多对巴以冲突的报道，对以色列和美国的地区和国际声誉有多大影响？

吴冰冰：从情感上讲，大家对大量平民的伤亡有同情心，对这种大规模的杀伤行为有反感。在中国，很多老百姓可能并不了解中东问题，甚至不知道巴勒斯坦具体在哪里，但通过社交媒体和官方媒体，看到平民遭受的苦难，这种情感的共鸣是人性的一部分。全球南方国家同样存在这样的情感反应。

在美国的大学校园里，也有游行示威和反对的声音，经常可以看到针对西方政治家的批评。 

韩桦：情感似乎会随着时间淡化，甚至有点麻木。对此，国际社会做了什么？

吴冰冰：确实，情感可能会随着时间的推移而淡化，但国际社会，特别是全球南方国家，仍在做出努力。例如，南非针对以色列的行动在国际法院有诉讼，非常积极。针对德国对以色列的支持，也有相关的诉讼和司法咨询。所以，只要这个问题存在，就会激发出一些行动，不可能完全被忽视。

韩桦：中国能否为推动中东地区长期稳定发挥更大作用？ 

吴冰冰：我们要量力而行，顺势而为。中东问题不是短期内能解决的，既然这么多国家花了这么长时间、想了这么多办法都没解决，我们就要认识到这个问题的复杂性。我们应积极参与，但也不能期待一次参与就能解决问题。需要积累历史经验和知识，尤其是在新的情况下，进行更多的人才投入，比如大量外交官的培养等。

我们不仅需要为中东问题储备人才和力量，也要为其他地区的潜在冲突做好准备。例如，拉美、亚太地区以及非洲的问题都是我们未来可能面对的。因此，从长远来看，这种人才的储备和经验的积累非常重要。

巴勒斯坦各派在京签署《关于结束分裂加强巴勒斯坦民族团结的北京宣言》（图源：外交部网站）

韩桦：智库学者应该发挥更大的作用，对吗？

吴冰冰：是的。智库学者可以围绕现有的冲突进行基础性的研究，为未来做长期的人才储备。比如，“北京对话”这样的活动，能够把不同的人聚集在一起，通过头脑风暴和人际交往，形成新的想法，建立新的关联，可能会带来意想不到的收获。

以下为英文译文：

（翻译：李泽西  王凡非）

HAN Hua: You have just returned from the Middle East, how do you evaluate the current situation in the Middle East on the whole? Is there a possibility of further escalation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? Can China play a more important role in the current situation?

WU Bingbing: The effect on the broader Middle East is actually limited in scope, it covers the Gaza Strip, Palestine, Lebanon, but not the entire Middle East region; so we see that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, including Egypt, these countries are still normal.In the early morning hours of October 26th, Israel struck Iran, around the same time my flight took off from the UAE, which was not affected in any way, the entire airport operated normally. This shows that although the local conflicts are very intense, the scale and scope of the conflicts are still limited in the broader Middle East. Many Chinese scholars say that the current situation in the Middle East is like a “storm in a teacup”, and that conflict in the warzone is very intense, the overall situation in the Middle East has not plunged the whole region into turmoil. This is very important. We can travel freely to many countries, including the Gulf States and North African countries, even Iran.

With regard to the conflict in Gaza, from the Israeli point of view, although they have set high military goals, such as the elimination of Hamas, the rescue of all hostages and the neutralization of the threat to themselves, in practice the goals have begun to be more focused. Now, Israel is focusing mainly on two corridors, one is the Philadelphia Corridor, which is the area separating the Gaza Strip from Egypt; it used to be under the joint control of Egypt and the Palestinians, which Israel intends to regain control of because of its fear of the flow of supplies into Gaza through the Sinai Peninsula. The other is the Nazarim Corridor, which divides Gaza into northern and southern sections, in order to respond to emergencies in a timely manner. Israel's military focus has shifted to control of the two corridors rather than full control of Gaza.

For Israel, it has entered a state of relatively low-intensity but sustained combat. Israel's center of focus has shifted to Lebanon since September, and despite air strikes and targeted killing operations, progress on the ground has been relatively slow. From the Lebanese perspective, Israel's goal is not to eliminate Hezbollah, but to ensure the safety of the population of northern Israel; threat of Hezbollah rockets has made it impossible for some 120,000 residents of northern Israel to live at home, leading to a massive population displacement. Therefore, the goal set by Israel in Lebanon was to protect security at home, not to achieve a complete military victory in Lebanon. Although Israel's actions have escalated, they are constrained by a number of external factors, such as France's and the United States' concern over the situation in Lebanon; neither of them want the conflict to expand to the whole of Lebanon. While there is a tendency to escalate, its intensity and strength is limited because if the conflict were to spread, it would involve a wider range of issues, including those related to Syria and Iran.

A long-term solution to the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict cannot be achieved by military means. All military actions ultimately require a political solution, and military means by themselves cannot deliver a permanent solution to the problem. China advocates for a political solution, and since we want a political solution, we have to sit down and talk. We saw this work with the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran last year; China's role as mediator in Middle East diplomacy is becoming more and more obvious.

In our view, China's position is clear: to reach a political settlement through mediation and to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. Conflicts in the Middle East are not limited to the Gaza Strip; there are also conflicts and challenges in Sudan, Yemen and other places. If these conflicts are not de-escalated and a political solution found, peace and stability will still be threatened. Therefore, China's efforts in the Middle East were not just in response to the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but for the long-term stability of the entire region.

From my visits in the Middle East, many locals are looking forward to China's role. Last year's rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran not only eased tensions between them, but also reduced the number of active conflict throughout the region, giving locals hope that conflicts can be de-escalated. Without this rapprochement, people may have lower expectations for peace and less confidence in the future. China's role is very important, especially in the current situation in the Middle East.

HAN Hua: What do you think will be the next opportunity for a political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

WU Bingbing: I think the challenge now is that Israel has its domestic political agenda. Because even before October 7th of last year, the domestic political conflicts in Israel were already very acute, millions of people were marching every weekend to express their dissatisfaction with the Netanyahu government's judicial reform measures. So from this perspective, the pressure of Israel's domestic politics influences their policy choices in the region.

In fact, while the conflict is going on, many domestic problems are temporarily downplayed. If the conflict subsides, the problems of domestic politics may bubble up again. Therefore, it is important to look not only at the United States and regional factors, but also to take note of the domestic factors in Israel. These factors have a great impact on the situation, and we haven’t reached the point in time for a resolution. The Israeli government has relieved domestic pressure through war, so for now it looks like the government still has a need (for war).

HAN Hua: What about the U.S. attitude toward this? Is Israel’s weapons orders a stimulant for the U.S. military-industrial complex? Do they maybe not want to push for a political settlement that quickly, is that a consideration?

WU Bingbing: U.S. aid to Israel is actually accomplished by allowing Israel to buy U.S. arms, but using U.S. military aid funds. This is one part. The other part is that the U.S. has front-loaded weapons stockpiles in Israel that Israel can use directly, or even mobilize weapons stockpiles in other areas. Therefore, Israel is consuming these supplies. And for the U.S., this becomes a domestic military program, which can increase output.

HAN Hua: That stimulates the U.S. military-industrial complex, right?

WU Bingbing: Yes. For the United States, it goes beyond that; they also benefit from the demand for its weapons from other Arab countries. Through foreign money buying U.S. arms, the U.S. domestic military industry is kept alive.

HAN Hua: Then among the Arab countries, Saudi Arabia, for example, who has been very low-key at this BRICS summit, that’s not quite consistent with their application to join BRICS. Is this related to Saudi Arabia's need for U.S. weapons?

WU Bingbing: The situation in the Middle East is very complicated, and Saudi Arabia's performance in Yemen shows the relative weakness of its national defense capabilities and its inability to maintain national security. They have to consider how to maintain their security in the face of Israel and Iran. And this is not just a question of how many arms to buy, but also the need to develop their own independent security capabilities. As of now, Saudi Arabia still needs external security support, and the country that can provide such comprehensive support is still the United States.

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States goes back a long way, so they have high expectations of the United States. Last year we saw that there have been discussions between Saudi Arabia and the United States about signing a defense agreement, and even a desire to elevate the relationship from a partnership to an alliance similar to that between South Korea and Japan. The Saudis want the U.S. to provide them with fuller security guarantees, even protection.

HAN Hua: The issue of national security is indeed critical. You mentioned the situation in the Middle East, where conflicts are more intense locally but relatively stable on a regional level. Does this reflect a tacit understanding?

WU Bingbing: With regard to the overall situation in the Middle East, we can see that Arab governments have taken a stand on the sidelines with regard to the conflict between Israel and Gaza, the conflict between Israel and Lebanon, and the conflict between Iran and Israel. Although they issued condemnations, such as on the Israeli strike on Iran, which was condemned by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, no real action has been taken. There is a consensus between the Gulf states and Iran that Israel should not be allowed to use their airspace for strikes, but this does not mean that they have chosen to take a stand in the conflict. The Gulf States and most of the Arab States governments have maintained an attitude of neutrality and happy to look on from the sidelines, an attitude that has determined that they are not deeply involved in the conflict.

HAN Hua: So the overall situation remains stable despite the intense localized conflicts?

WU Bingbing: Yes, from what we can see, these countries are still moving forward with their normal affairs in their own ways, and have not completely changed their diplomatic or security strategies because of the localized conflicts. This is also why the situation in the Middle East can maintain a “delicate balance” outside localized conflicts.

HAN Hua: What kind of strategy has Iran adopted in the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict? And what is its influence in the Middle East?

WU Bingbing: From Iran's point of view, the relationship between it and Israel is one of long-term attributional confrontation, because it is not possible for Iran to annihilate Israel, and likewise it is not possible for Israel to annihilate Iran. Therefore, Iran's attitude is clear, it is not trying to launch attacks on Israel without consideration for cost, but adopting a strategy of long-term resistance. As the head of its axis of resistance, Iran cooperates with non-state actors on the periphery, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which are directly involved in the conflict, and Iraq and the Houthis, which raid or attack Israel through their respective means. However, Iran itself avoids large-scale direct military confrontation with Israel.

Iran's strategy has been to provide equipment and advisory support rather than to engage directly in the war. Over the past decade or so, despite its military presence in Syria, Iran has exercised restraint and has not directly engaged in a full-scale war. Even when Israel attacked the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, Iran responded with restraint, avoiding leading to further exacerbation and escalation of the situation.

Overall, Iran's strategy is to maintain a low-cost mode of attrition to avoid high war expenses. In contrast to Israel's technological and intelligence superiority, Iran pushes up the cost of Israel's defenses by engaging in attrition through low-cost drones and missile weapons. Thus, from Iran's perspective, it wants to maintain this long-term stalemate without dragging the entire region into a large-scale conflict.

HAN Hua: Given this low-cost strategy of attrition, what do you think is Iran's national strategy?

WU Bingbing: Iran's strategy is mainly based on “resistance”, which is Iran's brand in the region, representing its opposition to the hegemony of the United States and its opposition to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. These two objectives are very clear. At the same time, Iran has a clear strategy in its neighborhood and in the Global South, which consists mainly of maintaining good-neighborly relations with neighboring countries and cooperation in the Global South, such as attention towards Central Asian countries, easing tensions with the Gulf countries, and attention towards China and Russia. Iran's rising partnerships in BRICS, SCO, Africa and Latin America are strategic objectives that complement each other to form an overall national strategy.

HAN Hua: These are all strategies that act in parallel, right?

WU BINGBING: That's right. Iran insists on resistance on the one hand and seeks development on the other. Resistance does not mean pure conflict, it is also a strategy. For example, on the nuclear issue and sanctions, Iran will communicate and coordinate with the West as necessary. This highly flexible strategy helps Iran expand its influence in the region.

HAN Hua: Now Saudi Arabia and Iran are planning to hold joint military exercises in the Red Sea waters, Egypt has also expressed interest in joining. Can you confirm this news? How will the U.S. and the West respond to this?

WU BINGBING: According to current reports, AFP mentioned that Saudi Arabia and Iran actually conducted joint exercises in the Gulf of Oman, not the Red Sea. The Red Sea is relatively more sensitive because of the presence of the Houthis. The exercises in the Gulf of Oman are more focused on the security of access to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. For Saudi Arabia and Iran, this is a mutual trust building step. By doing so, the two sides will not only increase mutual trust, but also reduce security conflicts along the Persian Gulf. It is also an important turning point in the rapprochement between the two sides.

Despite the long-standing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, reaching mutual trust remains a goal for both sides. The Saudi side also recognizes the importance of a stable and peaceful regional geopolitical environment in the context of economic development and Vision 2030. Therefore, the Saudis must take some proactive diplomatic action on the Iranian issue without relying exclusively on U.S. guarantees.

HAN Hua: So, is this also a way to strengthen military power through military exercises?

WU Bingbing: That's right. Saudi Arabia must take the initiative to improve its own security capabilities, not only through external dependence, but also by increasing its own strength.

HAN Hua: Does this Saudi attitude also represent the overall position of the Gulf countries? What about the UAE's attitude towards these conflicts, for example?

WU BINGBING: The UAE publicly condemned Israel after it launched an attack on Iran on October 26th. This also reflects the consensus between the Gulf States and Iran that Israel should not be allowed to utilize their airspace. This is not only the position of a single country, but the demand of all Gulf States.

HAN Hua: So there's a certain consensus among the Gulf states?

Wu Bingbing: Yes. A peaceful and stable Gulf region is good for both the Arab countries and Iran. As a result, interaction between the parties is likely to increase around these consensus. For example, we saw that after October 1, the Iranian foreign minister visited Qatar and met with the Saudi foreign minister. Qatar has been relatively more open and Saudi Arabia is making more diplomatic efforts. Although the pace varies from country to country, with some being more proactive and others following a little bit behind, there does seem to be a certain amount of tacit understanding between them overall.

HAN Hua: So what will be the impact of these interactions and balancing acts between the Gulf states, on the situation in Gaza?

WU Bingbing: The main Arab participants in the negotiations on a Gaza ceasefire right now are Qatar and Egypt. In Qatar, the negotiations are mainly led by the United States, Israel, Qatar and Egypt, while numerous Arab countries are not actually involved. The more countries there are, the more diplomatic weight they bring, but at the same time that would also introduce different voices, which can sometimes lead to resistance in solving the problem.

HAN Hua: Are the Arab countries divided on pushing for a ceasefire?

WU Bingbing: On the issue of Gaza, the goal is very clear: a ceasefire and humanitarian assistance. From this point of view, there are no major differences within the Arab countries. The main obstacle lies in the fact that the Israeli side keeps putting forward new demands, and the entry of Arab countries will strengthen the forces pushing for a ceasefire.

HAN Hua: Is there any role that the Arab countries can play in the political settlement?

WU Bingbing: The difficulty of a political solution lies in the fact that there is no post-war solution for Gaza. Israel's openness to a two-state solution has become weaker during the past year of conflict. Changing Israel's will now seems to be very difficult. As a result, the Arab countries do not have a clear operational plan either. In the absence of a clear statehood program on the part of Israel, especially with regard to the governance of Gaza, it is unlikely that the Arab countries will become deeply involved.

HAN Hua: So in practical terms, where should we start?

WU Bingbing: There is no clear Israeli operational plan for Palestinian statehood. For Israel, there is no realistic solution other than the two-state solution. However, the current emotional radicalization and domestic political problems make it very unlikely that a two-state solution will be advanced.

HAN Hua: How big is the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and spillover risks on global supply chains?

WU Bingbing: For now, the impact of this conflict on the global supply chain is limited. Although there may have been concerns about rising oil prices at the beginning, Israel did not strike Iran's oil facilities as it claimed, and international oil prices have instead tended to fall. Therefore, the impact of this conflict on the global economy is relatively small.

HAN Hua: “Limited impact of the conflict” sounds good, but does it also diminish the sense of urgency of the parties to stop the military conflict and push for a political solution?

WU Bingbing: Indeed, if the continuation of the conflict does not have a significant impact on global economic interests, there may be less urgency for the parties to push for a political solution. While the impact on some Red Sea littoral states would be greater, major countries such as Saudi Arabia are not currently expressing a clear desire to become deeply involved.

HAN Hua: Does this attitude mean that deep political involvement is not necessarily conducive to protecting economic interests?

WU Bingbing: Yes. Countries like Saudi Arabia may face greater challenges if they become overly involved in political and security matters. For example, the collective efforts of the international community, including numerous attempts by the United Nations and the United States, have failed to push Israel to a ceasefire. This makes countries more cautious in assessments of the effectiveness for their own involvement.

HAN Hua: And how should the participation and impact of the parties be assessed?

WU Bingbing: The main problem now is a difference in mindset. For its part, Israel still has the elimination of Hamas as its goal and is trying to weaken Hezbollah. Therefore, it still chooses a military solution to the problem. We believe that a military solution in itself is not a long-term solution, and this difference in perception

HAN Hua: Will the long-term impact on the global economy also be limited?

WU Bingbing: We have seen that commodity prices, especially for oil, have not been greatly affected. Although the Red Sea transportation route holds an important position for European and global oil supply, alternative options exist. Therefore, the overall impact is limited.

HAN Hua: How much does the negative media coverage of the conflict affect the regional and international reputation of Israel and the United States?

WU Bingbing: Emotionally speaking, we all have sympathy for the large number of civilian casualties, and anger for this kind of mass killing. In China, many ordinary people may not understand the Middle East issue, or even know exactly where Palestine is, but through social media and official media, they see the suffering of civilians, and this kind of emotional resonance is part of human nature. The same emotional resonance exists across the Global South.

There are also demonstrations and opposition on college campuses in the U.S., and criticism directed at Western politicians can often be seen. So, these emotions and human experiences are a normal reaction.  

HAN Hua: Emotions seem to fade over time and even lead to cynicism. What has the international community done about this?

WU Bingbing: It is true that emotions may fade over time, but efforts are still being made by the international community, particularly in the Global South. For example, there is litigation in the International Court of Justice against the actions of Israel, and South Africa has been very active in that regard. There is also litigation and judicial advice against Germany's support for Israel. So, as long as this issue exists, it will galvanize action and cannot be completely ignored.

HAN Hua: Can China play a role in driving change in the chronically unstable Middle East?

Wu Bingbing: We must act within our means and follow the trend. The Middle East problem cannot be solved in the short term, and since so many countries have spent so much time and thought of so many ways to try to solve it, we have to recognize the complexity of the problem. We should actively participate in it, but we should not expect to solve the problem with a one-off effort. There is a need to accumulate historical experience and knowledge, especially in new situations, and to make more investment in human resources, such as the training of a large number of diplomats.

We need to grow talent and know-how not only for the Middle East, but also for potential conflicts in other regions. For example, the problems of Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region and Africa are all problems that we may face in the future. Therefore, in the long run, this reserve of talent and experience is very important.

HAN Hua: Think tank scholars should play a bigger role, right?

Wu Bingbing: Yes. Scholars in think tanks can conduct basic research on existing conflicts to build a long-term talent pool for the future. For example, events at Beijing Club for International Dialogue can bring different people together, and through brainstorming and interpersonal interactions, new ideas can be formed and new connections made, which may bring unexpected benefits.